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In recent years the legal profession in Ontario has increasingly been
subjected to public scrutiny. Though only one of the twenty-two self-governing
professions in the province,' the legal profession is ubiquitous, pervades
most aspects of the social polity, and through its very role is perhaps peculiarly
vulnerable to public attack. Unlike the medical profession, its greatest com-
petitor for tangible recompense and prestige, the actions of lawyers affect
others in an economic sense. For all of these reasons the adequacy of the
self-government of the profession is being questioned.2 The government of
any profession must have as its primary aim the protection of the public,
and one substantial aspect of this is the disciplining of incompetence.3 A
second is ensuring that the public will be recompensed for any unfortunate
experiences in dealing with members of the profession. To a large extent,
the standards of incompetence are set by the courts, and it is these standards
which will determine ultimately who will be recompensed, and who may
be subject to discipline. While the insurance companies 'may ultimately
recompense, and while the law society may discipline, both will use the
courts' guidelines. The primary function of this note is to set out these
guidelines, and to suggest where they might be amended. The subject conve-
niently falls into a discussion of the legal relationship giving rise to legal obliga-
tion, of the duty of care of the lawyer, and of causation and damage. In two
final parts we survey an area peculiar to legal malpractice, that relating
to what may be loosely termed the judicial dilemmas stemming from
"procedural negligence"; we conclude with some observations on the self-
government of the profession and the protection of the client.
The Legal Relationship
In order to prefer a malpractice suit against a lawyer, a plaintiff
must first establish that a "relationship" exists between the two of them
*T. G. Bastedo, LL.B., Osgoode Hall Law School, was a member of the graduating
class of 1969.
1 ROYAL COMMISSION INQuiRy iNTo civx Riuoms (McRuer Report), Report Number
1, Volume II, Part III, Section 4, Self-Governing Professions and Occupations, p. 1159-
1229, at p. 1159.
2 McRUER REPORT, pp. 1159-1229.
3 Cf. In Re Anonymous 248 N.Y.S. 2d 368 (1964). "...the disqualifying factor
is unfitness, not just culpability. Indeed, culpability is relevant only because it may
bear on fitness."
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which gives rise to legal obligations; in order for the judiciary to give
effect to the legal obligation, the relationship must be legally delineated.
Ordinarily these tasks will cause little difficulty, though if the plaintiff
is not the lawyer's client he faces, in Canada, a nearly insurmountable
hurdle. Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence has insisted that the solicitor's
liability for malpractice be defined in contractual terms, 4 thus dismissing
actions framed in tort or outside the privity structure. In the United Kingdom
the peculiar immunity of the barrister was unsuccessfully challenged in the
great case of Rondel v. Worsley.5 But the reasons for this decision are rooted
in English legal history, and the case would seem to have little relevance
to those jurisdictions in which the bar is joined. In Canada, the differences
between the divided English bar and the joined Canadian bars were empha-
sized very early by the courts6 and the position has since been accepted that
since barristers in Canada may sue for their fees, they are also liable in
negligence actions.7 Though the type of practice a Canadian lawyer carries
on may indeed be relevant in a negligence action against him it will not
go to the determination of whether he is capable of being held liable for
breach of contract.
The question of whether a suit against a lawyer for negligence sounds
in tort or flows out of a contractual relationship is important chiefly in
problems relating to the Statute of Limitations. Since Anglo-Canadian juris-
prudence decrees that the Statute of Limitations begins to run when a cause
of action accrues, whether the cause of action accrues when the breach of
duty occurs (contract) or when the damage is actually suffered (tort), assumes
importance. The English and Canadian cases have resolutely taken the
former view on the basis that if a contract exists no other relationship can
exist concomitantly.8 A professional contractual relationship is sufficiently
wide to "smother" any tort duty which may (possibly) exist independently
of the contract. In order to arrive at this result, the courts have had to decree
that the Hedley Byrne case does not support the proposition that tort liability
may arise out of a solicitor's negligence. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest's
4 Groom v. Crocker [1939] 1 K.B. 194 (CA.) is the leading English case. Followed
by Clark v. Kirby-Smith [1964], 3 W.L.R. 239; Cook v. Swinfen [1967] 1 W.L.R. 457
(C.A.) and Rondel v. Worsley [1967] 1 Q.B. 443 (C.A.). In Ontario, see Schwebel v.
Telekes [1967] 1 O.R. 541 and Rowswell v. Pettit [1968] 2 O.R. 81.
5 [19671 1 Q.B. 443 (C.A.); affd [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1666 (H.L.). The argument,
based upon Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.)
was that even though the barrister was not in a contractual relationship with his client,
a duty of care giving rise to legal obligations, did exist. The argument was rejected
solely upon grounds of public policy. See P. N. North, From Hedley Byrne to Rondel v.
Worsley, (1968), 118 NEW LAW JoURNAL 137.
6 Leslie v. Ball (1863) 22 U.C.R. 512 (Q.B.); McDougall v. Campbell (1877) 41
U.C.R. 332 (Q.B.); Wade v. Bali (1870) 20 U.C.R. 302 (C.P.); Robertson v. Furness
(1879) 43 U.C.R. 143 (Q.B.); The Queen v. Joseph Doutre [1884] A.C. 745 (P.C.).
7 This argument is the substance of the decisions in the cases cited in footnote 6
above. See also Robinson and Morgan-Coakle v. Behan [1964] N.Z.L.R. 650.
8 See cases cited in footnote 4. The reasoning is adapted from Jarvis v. May, Davies,
Smith, Vanderwell & Co. [1936] 1 K.B. 399 (C.A.), and is best set out in a case
involving architects, Bagot v. Stevens Scanlon & Co. Ltd. [1966] 1 Q.B. 197, 203-05.
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formula of a duty of care stemming from reliance upon a special skill applied
for the purpose of assisting another was held not to be applicable to the
solicitor-client relationship.9
A second question of importance relating to the ambit of the lawyer's
duty centres upon the constricting effect of privity. Privity of contract will
be most important in those situations in which a party other than the
original party is injured. In the Ontario case of Re Fitzpatrick (1923)10, a
solicitor negligently failed to sign a will as an attesting witness. As a result,
the will was refused probate, an intestacy ensued, and the widow took one-
third of the estate rather than the entire estate. The widow's application
for an order declaring the solicitor negligent and liable for the loss she
sustained was disallowed - the claim was held to have no foundation
because there was no privity of contract between beneficiary and solicitor.
By closely adhering to the "contractual view" of the lawyer's liability,
the English and Canadian courts both ignore considerations of "justice",
and attempt to define the lawyer's obligations in terms which are surely too
narrow to encompass the realities and complexities of modem professional
practice. The cases in this area of the law are notable for their lack of
discussion of such matters as loss distribution and the responsibilities which
the lawyer must now bear. The considerations which ought to determine the
court's rulings may best be set out by reference to American cases concerning
the lawyer. In passing we may note that we do not advocate wholesale
abandonment of the common law tradition of stare decisis; in fact, we suggest
that the English and Canadian courts have much more room in which to
manoevre than at first glance may be supposed.
In his well known decision in the "bean" case of 1922, Mr. Justice
Cardozo said of the bean-weighers' duty: "We do not need to state the duty
in terms of contract or of privity. Growing out of a contract, it has none the
less an origin not exclusively contractual... Constantly the bounds of duty
are enlarged by the knowledge of prospective use."" Like the bean weighers'
duty, the lawyers' is more than contractual. Distasteful as it may be to the
professional ethic, the lawyer is today involved in an enterprise, and his actions
have ramifications for which he should be responsible which extend beyond
mere dealing with his client. The substance of this argument was accepted
9 Clark v. Kirby-Smith [1964] 3 W.L.R. 239, 241. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest's
formula in the Hedley Byrne case appears at [1964] A.C. 465, 502-03 (H.L.):
"It should now be regarded as settled that if someone possessed of a special skill
undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another
person who relies upon such skill, a duty of care will arise. The fact that the service
is to be given by means of or by the instrumentality of words can make no difference.
Furthermore, if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably
rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, a person
takes it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or
a'ice to be passed on to, another person, who, as he knows or should know, will place
reliance upon it then a duty of care will arise."
10 (1923) 54 O.L.R. 3, 7.
11 Glanzer v. Sheppard 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922). See also Ultramares Corporation
v. Touche 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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by the court in the Connecticut case of Licata v. Spector (1966),12 following
the sod-turning decision of Lucas v Hamm (1961). 13 Both cases involved
negligent solicitors who made errors in drawing wills which resulted in loss
to the plaintiff legatees. 14 In Lucas, the court held that the solicitor could be
held liable in either tort or contract and that whether the defendant ought to
be liable to a third party not in privity was a matter of policy. Chief Justice
Gibson concluded that in this case an affirmative answer would "not place an
undue burden on the profession". In Licata v. Spector, the court held that;
Liability for a negligent performance of a contract, or nonperformance should
be imposed where the injury to the plaintiff is foreseeable and where the contract
is an enterprise of the defendant and there are adequate reasons from policy for
imposing a duty of care to avoid the risk thus encountered as an incident to the
enterprise.15
Where the harm is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a negligent
act, there would seem to be little reason in law or in policy why a lawyer-
client contract would eliminate all tort claims whatsoever. 16 In the Common-
wealth, the Hedley Byrne case can be interpreted to permit tort claims in these
situations. Moreover, holding lawyers accountable for such negligence can
only help to control professional incompetence.
In the United States, it may indeed be true, as Dean West suggests, that
the question of whether the action for damages is framed in tort or contract,
"has not troubled the courts often and there has been little discussion of it"."
One reason for this lack of conern has been the willingness of the American
courts to accept arguments framed in tort or contract. Another has been some
courts' predilection to "start" the statute of linttations running at a point
in time which will permit a just decision. Since it is quite clear that in
Ontario, at least, a court may not extend a limitation period fixed by statute,18
the point at which the statute begins to run assumes great importance. In
Canada and in England, the statute will begin to run when the act of
negligence occurs and not when the injury is suffered. 19 In the United States,
the position taken by the courts varies from jurisdiction to jurisidiction. In
California 20 and New York, 21 the cause of action accrues, as in Canada, on
12 225 A. 2d 28 (1966) (Conn.)
13 364 P. 2d 685. (1961) (Calif.); cert. denied 368 U.S. 987.
14This point arose also in Maneri v. Amodeo 238 N.Y.S. 2d. 302 (1963). The
New York court refused to follow Lucas v. Hamm.
15 225 A. 2d 28, 29-30 (1966).
16 See: Lawrence H. Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Persons for Negligent
Malpractice (1967) H LAND AND WATER rAw (Rnvmw) 379.
1 John W. Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence (1959) 12 VANDERBILT L.
REv. 755, at p. 756.
18 In Ontario, see e.g. Stringer v. Nyman [1956] O.W.N. 182 (C.A.).
19 Smith v. Fox 6 Hare 386; 67 E.R. 1216 (1848); Schwebel v. Telekes, supra
note 4.
20 Fazio v. Hayhurst 55 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1967); Eckert v. Schaal 58 Cal. Rptr. 817
(1967). The latter case is discussed in Note, The Commencement of the Statute of
Limitations in Legal Malpractice Actions-The Need for Re-Evaluation: Eckert v.
Schaal (1967) 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 230.
21 Troll v. Glantz 293 N.Y.S. 2d. 345 (1968).
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the date of the negligent act; a contrary result came out of the District of
Columbia: Fort Myers Seafood Packers Inc. v. Steptoe and Johnson.22 In the
Fort Myers case, the statute was held to begin to run from the time at
which the plaintiff actually suffered injury. The court rejected the contention
that there was any difference between malpractice suits and other negligence
actions. Since the essence of a malpractice suit is negligence, and since the
measure of damages in an action against a lawyer is treated on a tort basis,2 3
it is difficult to find fault with this argument.
The Duty and its Breach
Once the plaintiff has established that his relationship with the lawyer
is such that he will have standing to press his suit, he must next show that
the lawyer has been negligent-that the duty owed by the lawyer to him has
been breached. It is in this aspect of his case that the plaintiff may well have
the most difficulty. Put in the simplest form, the plaintiff must show "that the
error or ignorance was such that an ordinary competent solicitor would not
have made or shown it."'24 Within these broad and uncharted boundaries,
a lawyer's "honest mistake" will go unpunished and the client will have no
means of recourse.
By accepting employment to render legal services, 25 the lawyer implicitly
agrees to carry out instructions with the care and skill required of a reasonably
competent solicitor,26 and to act in accordance with the general and approved
practices of the profession. When determining whether a lawyer's behavior is
negligent, the court may accept a defence established by evidence of the
"general and approved practice"Z; or, it may simply note an ordinary and
well-recognized precaution that must be followed to absolve a solicitor from
negligence. 28 Moreover, the mere fact that the practice is long established
will not protect a solicitor if the practice is found by the courts to be
"inconsistent with provident precautions against a human risk".29
Less easily articulated is the duty of the lawyer to protect his client.
For instance, the solicitor is not justified in simply remaining silent when
22381 F. 2d. 261 (1967). The District of Columbia Statute ran "from the time
the right to maintain the action accrues". In Ontario, the statute reads "after the cause
of action arose", producing an opposite result in the Schwebel case.
23 See Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence; also, Cook v. Swinfen [1967]
1 W.L.R. 457 per Lord Denning.
24 Aaroe and Aaroe v. Seymour [1956] O.R. 736, 737. Label, J citing cnAaLES-
WORTH ON NEGLIGENcE 2nd. ed. (1947), from p. 411.
2 5 The lawyer may be liable even if he has been paid no consideration for his
services. Glenn v. Haynes 66 S.E. 2d. 509 (1951).
26 Roswell v. Pettit [1968] 2 O.R. 81.
2 7 Winrob and Winrob v. Street and Wollen (1959) 19 D.L.R. (2d.) 172
(B.C.S.C.).
2 8 E.g. the failure of a solicitor to take the "ordinary conveyancing precaution" of
inspecting a head lease on behalf of a sub-lessee client was sufficient evidence on which
to find a solicitor negligent. Hill v. Harris [1965] 2 W.LR. 1331.
29 Lloyd's Bank v. Savory & Co. [1933] A.C. 201 235 (per Lord Wright), app'd
in Winrob and Winrob v. Street and Wollen, supra, note 27.
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it is plain that his client is rushing into an "unwise, not to say disastrous
adventure." 30 Legal malpractice may, then, stem from a failure to act-
to advise, to investigate, to disclose. 31 From a recent case in the Supreme
Court of Canada, it is evident that if a solicitor possesses special knowledge
which he could use to protect his client, he will be held negligent if he fails
to do so.3 2 These types of situations suggest that the solicitor's duty goes far
beyond that determined by his contract of instructions. At least in that area
outside of the specific tasks which the solicitor undertakes to perform, the
solicitor's liability might reasonably be supposed to sound in tort. Hedley
Byrne would seem applicable.3 3
Though it is difficult to define the ambit of a lawyer's duty towards his
client,3 4 it is clear that if the solicitor does make an "honest mistake" he
will not be held liable in a court of law. In Ontario the courts have declared
that "a solicitor does not undertake with his client not to make mistakes,
but only not to make negligent mistakes".3 5 The courts have for many years
adhered consciously to this policy of protecting the lawyer from suits stemming
from inaccurate opinions honestly and fearlessly given. In 1846 the Chief
Justice of Ontario said that, "The profession of law would be the most
hazardous of all professions if those who practice in any of the branches
were to be held strictly accountable for the accuracy of their opinions".36 This
opinion remains good law today. The lawyer is presumed to have discharged
his duty until the contrary is made to appear,3 7 and it is up to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the solicitor has strayed from the permissible posture of
errors of judgment and trespassed upon the road of negligence. In determining
whether the solicitor is liable to his client, the courts have been loath to
take notice of legal specialization or of the locale in which the solicitor
practices.38
While the lawyer's immunity from liability for his errors in judgment
probably contributes to independence and vigorous advocacy, the courts'
policy is of no assistance to the unfortunate and disadvantaged client. The
lawyer who has made the error may incur an increase in his insurance
premiums, but he suffers in no other way. In a sense, it is misleading to
30 Neushul v. Mellish & Harkavy (1967) 111 SJ. 399, per Lord Danckwerts.
31 See Ishmael v. Milington 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
32 Millican v. Tiffen Holdings Ltd. (1967) 60 D.L.R. (2d.) 469, reversing 53 D.L.R.
(2d.) 674 and restoring 49 D.L.R. (2d.) 416.
3 3 See above, p. 3.
34 One of the best general definitions appears in a decision of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, Hodges v. Cartes 80 S.E. 2d. 144 (1954). For a Canadian case,
see Cornell v. Jaegar (1967) 59 W.W.R. 513 (Man.) affd (1968) 63 W.W:R. 747
(Man. C.A.).
35 Meakins v. Meakins (1910) 2 O.W.N. 150. See also Howse v. Shaw (1913)
4 O.W.N. 971.
36Alexander v. Small and Gavan (1846) 2 U.C.R. 298, 300.
37 Dorf v. Relles 355 F.2d. 488 (1966) (7th Circ.). Also: Note Standard of Care
in Legal Malpractice (1968) 43 INDIANA L. J. 771.
S8Locality was a determining factor in Cook v. Irion 409 S.W. 2d. 475 (1966)
(Texas).
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state that the lawyer who makes an honest error is "guilty" of malpractice
in any sense. Yet a series of honest mistakes may well amount to incom-
petence. And certainly, a culpable error would seem to require that the
lawyer be penalized to an extent greater than the amount of the judgment
against him. In other words, the function of the court should be more than
penal; it must also be protective. The public has the right to be shielded from
incompetence, and the courts, in conjunction with the governing body of the
profession, must assume more responsibility than they have up to this time.39
Causation and Damage
As in other negligence actions, the plaintiff in a legal malpractice
suit must show that he has suffered damage and that the damage resulted
from the action taken by his attorney. Today, the causation question is little
disputed. However, in certain situations proof of damage may be a difficult
task to achieve. The.degree of causation in an action for damages for mal-
practice is the same as that required in an ordinary negligence suit: 40 the
plaintiff need only demonstrate the negligence was a proximate cause of the
injury, and there is no requirement that either the attorney's negligence be
the sole cause, or that the complaint must negative any other cause.
41
The broad rule as regards the damages to be awarded is that the party
whose rights have been violated is to be put in the same position, in so far
as it is monetarily possible, as if his rights had been observed. If there has
been no pecuniary loss, then no award (other than nominal damages)
will be made.42 Since the lawyer's liability has been held by the courts to stem
from his contract, his actual liability may be less than if it had sounded in
tort. Groom v. Crocker43 held, for instance that damages for mental suffering
could not be recovered in contract; therefore they would be less than if they
were to be awarded in tort which was circumscribed only by the "foreseeability
test". In Cook v. Swinfen,44 Lord Denning maintained that the measure of
damages in both tort and contract is the reasonable foreseeability of the
consequences. He then proceeded to hold that a client's actual breakdown
in health which, it was agreed, was a direct consequence of the solicitor's
negligent conduct of a divorce action, was not a foreseeable consequence.
The ratio of the case is difficult to square with the general principle purportedly
followed. Realistically, the question of damage claims against lawyers ought
to be treated on a tort basis.
39 This point is expanded below.
40Ward v. Arnold 328 P. 164 (1958) (Wash.).
41Modica v. Crist 276 P. 2d. 14 (1955) (Calif.); see also Licata v. Spector 225
A. 2d. 28 (1966) (Conn.).
42 These general principles are set out in British Westinghouse Electric & Manu-
facturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railway Co. of London Ltd. [1912] A.C.
673, 689 (per Lord Haldene), Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries
Coulso & Co. Ltd. [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 529 (Asquith, LI), and were applied in Ford
v. White & Co. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 885, and in Roswell v. Pettit [1968] 2 O.R. 81.
43 [1939] 1 K.B. 194.
44 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 457, 461 (CA).
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Perhaps of more import in proof of damage disputes is the problem
which arises when it is claimed that because of alleged negligence a case
either never reached a court or appellate tribunal, or that a case was lost in
court because of the negligent conduct of the plaintiff's lawyer. In either
situation the client must show that he suffered damage. The suit in which he
attempts to show this has popularly become known as a "suit within a
suit". In Pete v Henderson (1954) 45 a leading American case, an attorney
negligently failed to file notice of appeal, and his client was forced to pay
the original judgment against him. In order to show damage, the plaintiff
was required to show that the judgment in his case was erroneous and would
have been reversed in the higher court. Alluding to the difficulty of meeting
such a burden, the court declared that this factor "is no ground to deny the
right to present such proof if it can be made". The reviewing court will
peruse the evidence in order to determine whether the plaintiff has sustained
his burden
of establishing that, upon proper appeal, the verdict and judgment against it would
have been reversed under circumstances which would have required a directed
verdict in its favor upon retrial or the entry of judgment in its favor as a matter
of law.4 6
In part because of these difficulties, and in part because it is difficult to
convince one trial judge that another trial judge of equal jurisdiction rendered
such an erroneous judgment that it would have been reversed an appeal,
some commentators are of the opinion that the courts should exercise their
direction in favor of those who fall victim to a negligent lawyer.47 Conflict
accrues because in this area of legal malpractice, the rights of a third party,
the original opponent of the client, are affected.
Judicial Discretions and Dilemmas
It is in the area of "procedural negligence" that malpractice in the field
of law diverges most sharply from the other professions, for by a ruling of
the court an attorney's negligence may be "waived", and an action which
ordinarily would be dismissed because of a neglected time limit may be
allowed to proceed. The opposite party is by definition adversely affected, for
time limits are established to ensure fair and prompt hearings. As a general
principle, the courts will do all in their power to enforce expedition, and
"whenever a solicitor, by his inexcusable delay, deprives a client of his
cause of action, the client can claim damages against him". 48 Since a motion
to dismiss for want of prosecution must be specifically brought, and when
45269 P. 2d. 78 (1954) (Calif.).
46 Better Homes Inc. v. Rodgers 195 Supp. 93 (1961). In Allen v. Sir Alfred
McAlpine (1968) 1 All E.R. 543, a case concerning a motion to dismiss for want of
prosecution Diplock I stated in obiter that the onus was on the soliciter to show that the
client's claim in the action would not have succeeded had it been presented with diligence
(p. 554). Though there is little authority on the point, it is difficult to square this
statement with American auhorities.
47 Note, Attorney's Negligence: the Belated Appeal, (1967) 2 VALPARAISO UNIVER-
SITY L. REV. 141.
4 SAlien v. Sir Alfred McAlpine, supra., Note 46. (p. 547, per Lord Denning).
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brought may be either granted or denied, whether a solicitor may be found
negligent for delay will depend upon the success of the defendant's motion.
A recent series of British cases has extensively surveyed the considerations
which will prompt the court to grant a motion to dismiss.49 These cases, which
have already received consideration in Ontario,50 are important for the careful
balancing of the equities between plaintiff and defendant, and for the inclusion
as one of the factors to be considered in weighing the equities and in deciding
whether or not to grant the motion to dismiss, the ability of the plaintiff's
solicitor to meet a negligence claim. The court recognized that the solicitor's
material worth and whether he possessed negligence insurance were both
factors of significance and were to be weighed in reaching its decision.
The British decisions have tended to refuse a motion for dismissal for
want of prosecution where the plaintiff has no prospect of compensation,
where the delay will not prejudice the defendants, where justice can be
done in the trial, where the defendant's conduct debars him such as by default
in delivering a defence, or where the chance of success of a negligence action
against the plaintiff's solicitors is far from strong. On the other hand, the
courts will be inclined to grant a motion to dismiss if the delay is so great as
to amount to denial of justice, if it is impossible to have a fair trial at such
a late date, if the solicitor for the plaintiff is insured, if the plaintiff has
excellent prospects of success (and can therefore easily recover against the
solicitor), and if there is no real possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff. The
emphasis in the cases has thus been to ensure that, where the solicitor is at
fault in not pursuing a claim on behalf of his client, the client should not
automatically suffer if, all matters weighed, the defendant is not unduly
inconvenienced. Balancing plaintiff-defendant interests has, of course, always
been done when the court's discretionary power has been applied.51 For our
purposes, the British cases are more significant because plaintiffs and the
defendant's interests are articulated; plaintiff and solicitor are not equated.
The position of the client is examined and the determination of the issue rests
upon this examination. Whether or not the solicitor is "negligent" is a
subsidiary issue, and whether he will be found negligent or not will often
depend on whether the client will be able to achieve greater satisfaction this
way than by proceeding against the defendant.
In Canada, the issue has not surfaced in these terms, and the actual
positions of the parties have not been closely examined in the few reported
49 Allen v. Sir Alfred McAlpine & Sons Ltd.; Bostic v. Bermondsey and Southwest
Group Hospital Management Committee; Sternberg and another v. Hammond and
another [1968] 1 All E.R. 543 (CA); Clough v. Clough [1968] 1 All E.R. 1179; Marlton
(an infant) v. Lee-Leviten [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1214 (C.A.); Zimmer Orthopaedic Ltd.
v. Zimmer Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 852; 1968 1 W.L.R. 1349 (C.A.);
Fitzpatrick v. Batger & Co. Ltd. [1967] 2 All E.R. 657.
50 Clairmonte v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1969] 1 O.R. 364, 368
(Senior Master).
51 In the legal malpractice area, most cases probable arise through failure to renew
a writ whose time for service has expired. Writ renewal cases are determined on the
discretion of the Master . In Ontario, see Brown v. Humble [1959] O.R. 586; Mathews
v. Wilkes [19601 O.W.N. 336, Beebe v. Brown [1963] 1 O.R. 76; Stender v. McDonald
£19671 1 O.R. 295.
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cases concerning dismissal for want of prosecution.52 However, in the United
States Supreme Court, the question of the extent to which a negligent solicitor
binds his client has appeared with regularity in recent years.53 In the Wabash
Railroad Co. case the Court held by a 4-3 decision that since the petitioner
voluntarily chose his (negligent) attorney, he could not now avoid the
consequences of his agent's acts. In dissent, Black, J. held that the decision
was contrary to "fundamental ideas of fairness and justice". In subsequent
cases, Black paid short shrift to "mere paper-filing negligence", to "slight
formalistic delinquency."54 Formalitic attention to procedural rules severely
disadvantages the victim of an incompetent or negligent lawyer in most
instances. The position of the client should be examined and considered
separately from that of his lawyer and of the defendant. Few would disagree
with the opinion that clients "should not be forced to act as hawklike
inquisitors of their own counsel, suspicious of every step and quick to switch
lawyers". 5 Of course, prejudice or injustice to the defendant must be
avoided, but if this is achieved, then there would seem to be little cause for
refusing to allow a plaintiff-client his day in court. Limitation periods are not
arbitrary and exist solely to advance justice, not to thwart it.
Concluding Remarks
In Canada and in the United Kingdom, the courts have narrowly
circumscribed the legal scope of the relationship of the lawyer and the ones to
whom he is liable for error. While this view emphasizes the independence of
the professional, it does little to fit him into the twentieth century. It is
suggested that there is no adequate reason for severing the lawyer from the
foreseeability and enterprise liability tests which pertain to much of the
remainder of contemporary economic life, and that there is ample room
in the law for bringing the lawyer within the tenets of tort doctrine. As the
Law Society ponders ways in which to at once stave off close state regulation,
to control more strictly the bounds of incompetence within its ranks, and to
secure adequate means of recompensing those who have claims against the
profession, one of its more serious problems will be to set out standards of
conduct and liability. In large part, these must issue from the courts. If not
forthcoming, legislative action seems inevitable.
The second area of concern which emerges from the study relates to
the position of the individual who falls victim to the negligent lawyer. The
lawyer-client relationship goes beyond that of agency. In a world of com-
plexity, society now demands protection, and judicial position that a client
52See Russell v. Glassman [1959] Man. R. 464; Inglev. Peter Vaci & Sons Ltd.
[1961] O.W.N. 318; Picke v. Mitchell [1963] 2 O.R. 193.
53 Link v. Wabash Railroad Co. 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Beaufort Concrete Co. v.
Atlantic States Construction Co. 384 U.S. 1004 (1965); Pittsburg Towing Co. v.
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. 385 U.S. 32 (1966); Santena v. U.S. 385 U.S.
848 (1966).
54 Pittsburg Towing Co. case, (from p. 33).
55 Daley v. County of Butte 38 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1964).
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subrogates his rights and thereby deals himself out of court is no longer
adequate. All interests must be weighed and considered in order to meet the
ends of justice. This will call for closer attention to realities than to tech-
nicalities. It may also call for closer relations between courts and self-
governing bodies. There seems little reason why transcripts of cases should
not be sent to self-governing bodies for disciplinary action. It is only by
attention to justice and to the public that the law profession can in the long
run retain its independence and its pride of service.

